Op-Ed: A Moral Society Ought Not To Consider the Death Penalty

By Cindy Toh

#SaveNagaenthran. A hapless attempt at saving the life of an intellectually disabled man convicted of a drug offense from execution. A hashtag that ignited an international reckoning over the death penalty. But what cannot be ignored is that Nagaenthran K. Dharmalingham was a statistic: he was 1 of 11 men who was executed in 2022 under the Singaporean legal system due to a drug-related offense, an act only expected to continue this year.

Nagaenthran was executed 10 months ago today, yet the movement he’s emboldened still stands. It is fair to say that unfettered access to drugs is a problem that demands concrete, meaningful solutions. It is fair to say that a moral society should not be conducive to the crime of any sort, including drug crimes. But if a society is to truly be moral, it ought not to consider the death penalty as a retributive solution to pressing crime.

What truly constitutes a moral society? A moral society is universally defined as one that distinguishes right from wrong. Dignity, justice, and freedom, all of which are ubiquitous under the rule of law, are essential to this definition. Therefore, it can be argued that a moral society is one that upholds the rule of law, enforcing the law fairly and consistently.

The death penalty, however, is incompatible with this assertion in this case and beyond. While Singapore’s 1973 Misuse of Drugs Act criminalizes drug trafficking with the death penalty, the legislation in and of itself is flawed in how its eradication of an individual’s Article 9 right to life under the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (“Liberty of the Person”). Freedoms cannot exist without the right to life, so to seize one’s right to life is to seize their freedom and dignity, an action antithetical to the rule of law. But even if the death penalty were applied in a murder case, it would still be legally inconsistent in its pursuit of justice. Simply put, responding to killing by killing is not an appropriate nor effective means to condemn the act.

Many proponents will argue that there is a high propensity of constituent support for the death penalty and that politicians were elected to represent the will of their constituents (Lam). While the legality of the death penalty testifies to this, legality does not equate to morality. Just because a law exists, it does not mean that it is compatible with the concept of a moral society.

Yet, this begs the question: isn’t it moral to reduce crime and deter immoral acts in the future? There is no doubt that crime reduction and deterrence are objectives both proponents and opponents of the death penalty wish to achieve. However, in a moral society where prevention and rehabilitation were the core of criminal justice reform, the death penalty would not be necessary. And contrary to popular opinion, there is no conclusive evidence that suggests the death penalty alone is itself a deterrent to crime, for there are other variables to account for (“Deterrence”). For instance, Iceland is considered the safest country in the world, despite it not having the death penalty since its abolition in 1928 (Sigurðarson). However, it does have a criminal justice system that emphasizes rehabilitation and heavily invests in factors that prevent crime such as police involvement, poverty alleviation, and education acts that Singapore could further emulate.

In a society where right triumphs wrong, a legally inconsistent, immoral, and ineffective means of retributive justice is not the answer to crime. Lives and the rule of law are at stake. Rights ought to be upheld and measures of accountability within the criminal justice system are impartial, humane, and consistent. Only then can there truly be a moral society?